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EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND THE LAW 
OF AERIAL WARFARE 
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT* 
Law responds almost instinctively to tectonic shifts in warfare.1 For 
instance, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 constituted a dramatic 
reaction to the suffering of civilian populations during World War II.2 
Similarly, the 1977 Protocols Additional3 updated and expanded the law 
of armed conflict (LOAC) in response both to the growing prevalence of 
non-international armed conflicts and wars of national liberation and to the 
recognized need to codify the norms governing the conduct of hostilities.4 
In light of this symbiotic relationship, it is essential that LOAC experts 
carefully monitor developments in military affairs, because such 
developments may well either strain or strengthen aspects of that body of 
law.5 As an example, the widespread use in Iraq of civilian contractors and 
 
 
 * Professor of International Law and Director, Program in Advanced Security Studies, George 
C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The law review 
has relied on the integrity and expertise of the author for asserted military facts that are not supported 
by a citation.  
 1. Albeit usually lagging behind practices on the battlefield by periods measured in years. See 
Michael N. Schmitt, Future War and the Principle of Discrimination, 28 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 51 
(1999).  
 2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol Additional I]. 
 4. Cases of law formulation in anticipation of prospective methods or means of warfare are far 
less common. An example is Protocol IV to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, which 
outlaws the use of blinding laser weapons by Parties thereto. See Convention on the Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 
I.L.M. 1218. 
 5. See Michael N. Smith, War, Technology, and International Humanitarian Law, OCCASIONAL 
PAPER SERIES (Harv. Univ. Program on Humanitarian Pol’y and Conflict Res., Cambridge, Mass.), 
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employees to perform an array of tasks that were traditionally the province 
of military personnel has generated heated debate over the legal notion of 
direct participation in hostilities.6 
Perhaps the most noteworthy contemporary transformation of 
warfighting doctrine was noted by U.K. Secretary of State for Defense, 
Geoff Hoon, in the December 2003 U.K. Ministry of Defense White Paper 
Delivering Security in a Changing World.7 In that document, Hoon 
proclaimed that the complexity of the new security environment has 
impelled a move away from “simplistic platform-centric planning to a 
fully ‘network-enabled capability’ able to exploit effect-based planning 
and operations.”8 Such a revolutionary shift in the execution of combat 
operations renders a normative response inevitable. 
This article explores effects-based operations (EBO) to ascertain how 
they might affect the law of armed conflict. In light of the dominance of 
American military power,9 the U.S. approach to EBO, which is now 
reflected in the doctrine of other nations as well as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), will serve as our model. Although EBO 
applies to every dimension of conflict, including the information sphere, it 
reaches its apogee in aerial warfare. Therefore, conflict in that medium 
will serve as the particular context of inquiry. 
 
 
Summer 2005, available at http://www.hpcr.org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper4.pdf.  
 6. A major multiyear research effort sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and the T.M.C. Asser Institute is being conducted by a group of international experts on the 
subject. For reports on the work completed to date, see http://www.icrc.ch/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/ 
iwpList575/459B0FF70176F4E5C1256DDE00572DAA. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian 
Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 511 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” and 21st Century 
Armed Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 505 (Horst Fischer et al. 
eds., Berlin, BWV 2004). 
 7. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DELIVERING SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, 2003, Cm. 6041, at 
1, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-4550-99C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/ 
cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf [hereinafter MOD WHITE PAPER].  
 8. Id. NATO has now adopted the doctrine of effects-based operations, styling it EBAO—
effects-based approach to operations. “Effects Based Approach to Operations, or EBAO, aims to 
select those capabilities that produce the required effects and avoid wasteful effort and unnecessary 
attrition. EBAO encourages solutions that employ integrated joint military capability rather than stand-
alone naval, land or air solutions.” Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, Remarks to NATO Defense College 
General and Flag Officers and Ambassadors Course, Brussels, Belgium (Oct. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/speeches/2005/051026asactndcfogo.html. 
 9. U.K. aircraft flew 2519 sorties (1353 strikes) of the 41,400 Coalition total during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Further, of 29,200 weapons released, British aircraft accounted for 906 (excluding 
Tomahawk launches). U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., OPERATIONS IN IRAQ: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 86 
(2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/iraq-ops_lessons_ 
ukmod_dec03_opsiniraq.pdf.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/2
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In terms of the law of armed conflict, the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s 
2005 The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (U.K. Manual) shall be 
used as a frame of reference.10 The U.K. Manual is the most recent LOAC 
manual adopted by any major military power, and it meticulously captures 
those principles that currently govern aerial combat.11 As a military 
manual, it is infused with a sensitivity to the conduct of military operations 
that is often absent from a naked treaty. Thus, it is more useful than treaty 
text when assessing the impact of changes in the nature of military 
operations on the law governing these operations.12 But before turning to 
legal issues, it is necessary to understand effects-based operations and the 
evolution of airpower doctrine that underpins EBO. 
THE EVOLUTION OF AIRPOWER DOCTRINE 
World War I represented the first concerted use of airpower in armed 
conflict. Early in the war, air forces engaged in surveillance and 
reconnaissance of enemy forces. They also began to provide a rudimentary 
form of close air support to ground forces directly engaged in combat. 
However, it was not until the 1917 Zeppelin raids on London that 
 
 
 10. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2004) [hereinafter U.K. MANUAL]. 
 11. Id. Although an effort by the Department of Defense to produce a new manual is underway, 
the most current manual in force is over a decade old. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M, MCWP 
5-2.1, COMDTPUB P5800.7, para. 8.1.1 (1995), 78 INT’L L. STUD. (1999) [hereinafter 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. The U.S. Army manual was published in 1956. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, (Field Manual 27-10) July (1956). The U.S. Air Force manual was 
produced in 1976 but has since been rescinded without replacement. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, Air Force 
Pamphlet 110-31 (Nov. 19, 1976). 
 In 2005, the ICRC released its long awaited Customary International Humanitarian Law Study. 
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter CIHLS]. Although the CIHLS has 
proven controversial in certain respects, it generally tracks those provisions of the U.K. Manual that 
are relevant to the subject of this chapter. This is particularly important because treaty law provisions, 
such as Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, provide one source of law for certain provisions of the 
U.K. Manual. While the respective treaty is not binding on non-Party States, to the extent such a treaty 
norm reflects customary law, it would bind the latter.  
 12. Of course, it might be objected that the U.K. is a party to treaties, such as Protocol Additional 
I, supra note 3, or the Statute on the International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(B)(ix), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9* (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 
to which other states, most notably the United States, are not a party, and that therefore the U.K. 
Manual is not a sufficiently universal restatement of the LOAC for such an analysis. However, the 
U.K. Manual provisions implicated by effects-based operations are, except as discussed below, 
generally deemed reflective of customary international law and would therefore bind states that are not 
party to the treaties codifying them. In this regard, cross citations to the ICRC’s CIHLS, supra note 11, 
are provided whenever U.K. Manual provisions are referenced. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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airpower’s nascent strategic strike capabilities were tested. By late 1918, 
the U.S. Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force had developed a 
strategic bombing plan designed to “drop aerial bombs upon commercial 
centers and the lines of communications in such quantities as will wreck 
the points aimed at and cut off the necessary supply lines.”13 This was a 
classic attrition strategy targeted against the enemy’s logistical lifeline: 
starve the war machine by destroying the sources of the supplies that feed 
it. 
The Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted in the aftermath of the war, 
criticized this approach, urging instead adoption of an early form of 
effects-based planning: 
A careful study should be made of the different kinds of industries 
and the different factories of each. This study should ascertain how 
one industry is dependent on another and what the most important 
factories of each are. A decision should be reached as to just what 
factories if destroyed would do the greatest damage to the enemy's 
military organization as a whole. . . .  
World War I showed that successful application of airpower 
requires a predetermined plan calculated to destroy the enemy's will 
and war sustaining capability. Achieving this goal requires 
systematic analysis to determine which targets, if destroyed, would 
do the greatest damage to the enemy.14  
Consistent with this recommendation, officers at the U.S. Air Corps 
Tactical School (ACTS) refined strategic bombing notions. The key, in the 
minds of theorists such as Major Donald Wilson, lay in identifying those 
few vital targets, the destruction of which could both deprive the enemy of 
war material by crippling its industrial capability and erode civilian 
support for the government and war effort.15 Achieving such results would 
require as yet unachievable precision bombing capabilities. 
On the other side of the fence were those who urged relatively 
unrestricted bombing, including attacking civilian populations. Italian 
Brigadier General Gulio Douhet championed this tactic in his 1921 classic, 
 
 
 13. U.S. Air Force, Intelligence Targeting Guide (AF Pamphlet 14-210), attachment 2 (Feb. 1, 
1998) [hereinafter U.S. AF Pamphlet 14-210]. See this attachment generally for a summary of 
airpower theory. For a full treatment of the history of airpower, see STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, AIR 
POWER: THE MEN, MACHINES AND IDEAS THAT REVOLUTIONIZED WAR, FROM KITTY HAWK TO GULF 
WAR II (Viking Press 2004).  
 14. U.S. AF Pamphlet 14-210, supra note 13. 
 15. See Nathan Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision 
Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 440–41 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/2
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Command of the Air.16 Douhet suggested that the civilian population and 
its morale were important centers of gravity that should logically be 
targeted.17 Responding to charges of immorality, Douhet noted that in 
twentieth century warfare, the civilian population contributed to the war 
effort through its work in industry. Thus, targeting certain civilians was 
not a question of striking innocents, but rather a justifiable act based on 
their contribution to the enemy’s military wherewithal. He argued that this 
would result in earlier conflict termination, thereby promoting 
humanitarian ends.18 Unlike the rather surgical ACTS approach, precision 
was not essential in unrestricted bombing operations.  
The ACTS vision of strategic attack proved impossible to implement 
during World War II because of the need to fly during darkness and at 
high altitudes to avoid enemy air defenses and the lack of sufficiently 
accurate weaponry. Inevitably, both sides began to target the civilian 
population—especially industrial workers. For instance, Bomber 
Command Directive 22 set forth the Royal Air Force (RAF) strategy of 
attacking civilian morale.19 This strategy was driven by the reality that, as 
Secretary of State for Air Sir Archibald Sinclair said, “in order to destroy 
anything it was necessary to destroy everything.”20 Although the U.S. 
Army Air Force (USAAF) purported to conduct daylight precision 
bombing, in reality, the results were far from precise.  
By the Vietnam War, advancements in technology made it possible to 
begin achieving the level of precision that had formed the basis of earlier 
concepts of air warfare. Laser-guided weapons, such as the Paveway, 
 
 
 16. GULIO DOUHET, THE COMMAND OF THE AIR (D. Ferrari trans., 1921), reprinted in ROOTS OF 
STRATEGY: BOOK 4, at 262 (David Jablonsky ed., Stackpole Books 1999). 
 17. “By bombing the most vital civilian centers [the attacker] could spread terror through the 
nation and quickly break down [its] material and moral resistance.” Id. at 332. 
 18. Douhet wrote: 
Tragic, too, to think that the decision [to submit] in this kind of war must depend on smashing 
the material and moral resources of a people caught up in a frightful cataclysm which haunts 
them everywhere without cease until the final collapse of all social organization. Mercifully, 
the decision will be quick in this kind of war, since the decisive blows will be directed at 
civilians, that element of countries at war least able to sustain them. These future wars may 
yet prove to be more humane than wars in the past in spite of all, because they may in the 
long run shed less blood.  
DOUHET, supra note 16, at 336. 
 19. The Directive stated that “operations should now be focused on the morale of the enemy 
civilian population and in particular, of industrial workers.” MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND 147 
(Dial Press 1979). 
 20. STEPHEN L. MCFARLAND, AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF PRECISION BOMBING: 1910–1945, 166 
(Smithsonian Institution Press 1995). On the British offensive strategy fathered by Air Marshall Hugh 
Trenchard, see DAVID R. METS, THE AIR CAMPAIGN: JOHN WARDEN AND THE CLASSICAL AIRPOWER 
THEORISTS 21–30 (Air Univ. Press 1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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permitted single attacks against targets that had previously required 
multiple sorties and no small degree of luck to neutralize. However, 
precision-guided munitions (PGM) were not widely available and most air 
to ground attacks continued to employ “dumb bombs.”  
Operation Desert Storm marked a watershed in precision attack. 
Although only 6.7% of munitions dropped were guided,21 PGMs proved 
astonishingly accurate.22 Additionally, the constant video footage of 
precision attacks shown during Coalition press briefings created public 
expectations about “smart weapons.” These expectations included the 
potential for minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury, which 
exceeded the actual capabilities of even the well-equipped American air 
forces. Precision bombing had finally come of age. However, before it 
could become a strategy in and of itself, the percentage of PGMs in the 
inventory would have to climb dramatically. 
Inevitably, that occurred. During NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, PGMs constituted 34% of 
weapons dropped.23 By Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan two 
years later, that figure had risen to 60%, whereas the comparable 
calculation for Operation Iraqi Freedom was approximately 70%.24  
Of course, precision guided munitions are useless without accurate 
target intelligence and reliable communications/data links. Today, 
dramatic technological advances enable U.S. forces to “rapidly collect, 
share, access, and manipulate information.”25 In some cases, a direct link 
from sensor to delivery system exists. This heightens the ability of aircraft 
to strike the right target, in the right way, right away. Additionally, the 
real-time nature of the information provides “shooters” enhanced 
situational awareness, thereby helping to minimize collateral damage to 
civilian objects and incidental injury to civilians. 
Command and control technologies have likewise experienced 
phenomenal improvements. Commanders far from the battlespace can now 
watch battles unfold, even at the tactical level. They can also marshal and 
 
 
 21. MICHAEL R. RIP & JAMES M. HASIK, THE PRECISION REVOLUTION: GPS AND THE FUTURE 
OF AERIAL WARFARE 212 (Naval Inst. Press 2002).  
 22. Nearly 85% of PGMs hit within ten feet of the desired aim point. Stuart W. Belt, Missiles 
over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in 
Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV., 115, 117 (2000). 
 23. Canestaro, supra note 15, at 451 nn.127–28. 
 24. U.S. CENTR. COMMAND AIR FORCES, ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS DIVISION, OPERATION 
IRAQI FREEDOM—BY THE NUMBERS (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ 
report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf. 
 25. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING, Joint Publication 3-60, at I-5 
(Jan. 17, 2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/2
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direct forces with unprecedented speed and react to changes in the flow of 
combat almost as quickly as events occur. 
Finally, qualitatively new aerial platforms are dramatically reshaping 
warfare. For instance, unmanned aerial vehicles are replacing manned 
aircraft in reconnaissance and surveillance missions and have been used 
for time-sensitive attacks on fleeting targets. Equally significant in terms 
of the evolution of airpower doctrine are stealth aircraft, such as the F-117 
and B-2, which decrease aircrew risk and make the battlespace more 
penetrable. 
These technological advances, together with the advent of effects-
based planning, have enabled the emergence of a new concept of 
operations: parallel war.26 In a sense, air warfare has finally arrived at the 
point only dreamt of by early airpower theorists—the capacity to strike 
beyond the battlefield at targets that undercut both the enemy’s ability to 
fight effectively and its will to continue.  
PARALLEL WARFARE 
Traditionally, air bombardment was serial. For instance, in an attack 
against a high value, well-defended target set, the first strikes would be on 
early warning radars. Attacks would then flow sequentially through 
sector/interceptor operations centers, airfields, and surface-to-air missile 
sites until finally hitting the desired target. But even when air supremacy 
was achieved, the number of sorties required to reliably neutralize targets 
precluded mass simultaneous attacks across the battlespace. 
Recent advances in technology and doctrine have overcome this 
limitation, making parallel warfare possible. The U.S. Air Force defines 
parallel attack (the operationalized aspect of parallel warfare) as 
“[s]imultaneous attack of varied target sets to shock, disrupt, or 
overwhelm an enemy, often resulting in decisive effects.”27 Parallel 
attacks can be conducted concurrently at “multiple levels of war and 
[achieve] rapid effects that leave the enemy little time to respond.”28  
Parallel differs from traditional warfare in three ways. The first is 
temporal. With parallel operations, aerial forces can mount a devastating 
number of attacks in a very short period, rather than conducting serial, 
 
 
 26. For an explanation of parallel warfare by a leading contemporary airpower theorist, see 
BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID A. DEPTULA, EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS: CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF 
WARFARE (Aerospace Educ. Found. 2001). 
 27. U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR WARFARE, AF Doctrine Document 2-1, at 108 (Jan. 22, 2000). 
 28. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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attrition attacks on enemy forces over time. Space is the second 
dissimilarity. Because technology now allows targets to be hit anywhere, 
distance no longer constitutes an effective shield against attack. Third, in 
traditional warfare, tactical effects combine over time to yield operational 
effects, and cumulative operational effects eventually generate strategic 
effect.29 By contrast, parallel warfare allows the generation of effects at 
any level of warfare (or multiple levels simultaneously) at any time during 
the conflict. 
Technological advances that free up weapons delivery platforms to 
conduct attacks against the enemy system underlie parallel warfare 
capabilities. With improved precision capabilities, fewer attacks are 
needed to destroy or otherwise neutralize a target. For example, a B-17 
during the Second World War had a circular error probable (CEP)30 of 
roughly 3300 feet. To achieve a high probability of destruction of a point 
target from 6500 feet, approximately 9000 bombs from 1500 aircraft had 
to be dropped.31 By comparison, current CEPs are such that a single bomb 
 
 
 29. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms defines the levels of war as 
follows: 
 Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and 
executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities 
at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to 
each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.  
 Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are 
planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other 
operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational 
objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the 
operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain 
these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they 
ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by 
which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.  
 Strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group 
of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and 
guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities 
at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; 
define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; 
develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military 
forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Publication 1-
02, as amended through Aug. 8, 2006, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/. 
 30. Circular error probable is the radius of a circle within which half of the bombs dropped will 
strike. Id. at 86. 
 31. Colonel Gary L. Crowder, Div. Chief Air Combat Command & Plans Dir. Strategy, 
Concepts, and Doctrine, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Effects Based Operations Briefing (Mar. 19, 2003), 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2067 [hereinafter Effects Based 
Operations Briefing].  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/2
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can often neutralize a target. This dramatically increases the number of 
targets that a set number of aircraft can attack.32  
Stealth also helps enable parallel warfare. Contrast conventional with 
stealth attacks during Operation Desert Storm, the first campaign with 
significant use of stealth aircraft.33 In a conventional operation, attacking 
aircraft comprise a “package” that “fights” its way to the objective. One of 
the initial packages into Basra consisted of forty-one aircraft, only eight of 
which (four A-6s and four Tornadoes) were “bomb-droppers.”34 The eight 
struck a single target using three different aimpoints (points where the 
bombs are intended to strike).35 Accompanying them were four F-18s to 
provide “sweep and escort” services, that is, to “sweep” the area of any 
enemy aircraft before the package enters and escort the package to and 
from the target.36 An additional twenty-nine aircraft conducted defense 
suppression tasks along the ingress and egress routes.37  
Stealth aircraft need no escort. On the contrary, non-stealthy escorts 
would reveal their presence and position. The twenty F-117s launched on 
the first night of Operation Desert Storm (each carrying two independently 
targetable weapons) struck twenty-eight different targets with thirty-eight 
total aimpoints.38 Thus, the F-117s hit nineteen more targets than the Basra 
package with half the aircraft. Although stealth aircraft are not appropriate 
for all types of attack, to the extent they can replace conventional packages 
for given targets, they free up non-stealth aircraft for other missions.39  
 
 
 32. Most significant in this regard is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a guidance tail 
kit that attaches to existing gravity bombs. With an inertial navigation system and global positioning 
system satellite link, the JDAM can achieve a CEP of approximately twenty feet. Although not as 
accurate as certain other weapons systems, the JDAM is revolutionary for three reasons. First, it is 
cheap at roughly $20,000 a copy, thereby allowing precision munitions to comprise a far greater 
percentage of the bomb inventory. Second, it can be carried by most attack aircraft with only minor 
modifications. Thus, the number of aircraft available for precision strikes grows. And third, each 
JDAM is independently targetable. For example, a B-1 can employ twenty-four JDAMs, each against a 
different target. As with precision advances in general, the net effect of the JDAM is to enable striking 
many more targets more quickly than was previously possible using a constant number of aircraft. 
 33. See Effects Based Operations Briefing, supra note 31. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Three drones “tickled” enemy air defenses to allow attacking forces to locate them. Four F-
4G “Wild Weasels,” armed with anti-radiation missiles, were tasked with attacking enemy surface-to-
air-missile sites that dared activate their radar, while five EA6-B Prowlers conducted electronic 
warfare by jamming enemy systems. Finally, seventeen F-18s were available to defend against enemy 
aircraft along the ingress route. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. The numerical relationship set forth here is not a constant. To the extent enemy air defenses 
are eroded over time, the size and composition of attack packages change. Other technologies even 
further increase the volume of fire that can be directed against the enemy. For instance, the benefits of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Effects-based operations, a relatively new concept of operations, also 
enable parallel warfare. To grasp the impact of effects-based operations, 
one must understand that war ultimately serves political or strategic 
ends.40 In classic attrition or annihilation warfare, this end is achieved by 
progressively weakening the enemy through the serial destruction of its 
military assets and its support structure. Thus, destruction of four airfields 
is better than two, five factories better than three, and so on. Success is 
quantified through lists of objects destroyed, damaged, or neutralized. The 
“body count” pejoratively illustrates this approach. 
In effects-based operations, the goal remains Clausewitzian,41 but 
targeting is “focused on creating specific effects to achieve the joint force 
commander’s (JFC’s) campaign objectives or the subordinate component 
commander’s supporting objectives.”42 Reduced to basics, effects-based 
operations “provide the commander with a methodology linking objectives 
with effects throughout the battlespace.”43  
The EBO logic flow begins with identification of the effect(s) that will 
achieve the JFC’s objective (which relates to the overall political 
objectives). The enemy’s systems are then deconstructed to determine 
which components should be attacked to best realize the desired effect. At 
that point, it becomes possible to determine the most effective attack 
aircraft (or other platform), weapon, and tactic. This process addresses the 
causality between actions and their effects; concentrates on desired effects, 
both physical and behavioral; models the enemy as a system of systems; 
and considers timing, because the desirability of specific effects depends 
on the context in which they are created.44  
 
 
precision are enhanced by the smaller size of weapons (more weapons per airframe) and the smaller 
explosive force made possible by accuracy (thereby limiting collateral damage and incidental injury). 
An example is the Small Diameter Bomb (SMB) under development. A 250 pound bomb with 
excellent penetration capability but only 50 pounds of explosive, the SMB can be used against 
hardened targets without risking high collateral damage and incidental injury. Coinciding with 
improved weapons technologies are advances in information technologies that enhance target system 
analysis, target identification, and battle damage assessment. The net result is that the enemy system is 
better understood and more vulnerable at less risk to its attacker. 
 40. MOD White Paper, supra note 7, at 4.4. 
 41. In On War, the nineteenth century Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von 
Clausewitz, penned his most famous line: “[W]ar is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with 
the addition of other means. In other words, war is always ultimately infused with some political 
purpose.” CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 605 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., Michael 
Howard & Peter Paret trans., indexed ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (emphasis added). 
 42. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 25, at I-1. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Brigadier General David Deptula, one of the architects of the Operation Desert Storm air 
campaign, illustrates the distinction by reference to the Coalition’s desire to destroy the four sector 
operations centers (SOC), which provided Iraqi air defense command and control. Initially, planners 
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It is particularly important to appreciate the various forms of effects 
that are realizable through an attack, because each form can contribute to 
achieving the intended objective. Most recognizable are direct effects, “the 
immediate, first order consequence[s] of a military action . . . unaltered by 
intervening events or mechanisms.”45 For example, in bombardment, 
direct effects are those caused by the weapon’s immediate blast and 
fragmentation.  
Indirect effects, which are “the delayed and/or displaced second- and 
third-order consequences of military action,” are frequently as crucial to 
effects-based operations as direct effects.46 In many cases, indirect effects 
may be difficult to notice because they involve no more than subtle 
changes in enemy behavior. This does not diminish their importance. 
Consider an attack on a command and control facility. Aside from the 
destruction caused, such an attack creates confusion in the enemy’s 
operations, which may undermine enemy moral and confidence, and 
thereby further diminish combat effectiveness. 
Whether effects are direct or indirect, three characteristics of effects 
determine their qualitative impact on enemy operations. The first is their 
sometimes cumulative nature, that is, effects may compound such that the 
ultimate outcome is greater than the sum of individual ones. For instance, 
attacking individual surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites every time their 
radar illuminates incoming friendly aircraft may deter the enemy from 
using its SAM network at all. 
Second, effects may also “cascade,” in that a direct effect generates 
indirect effects that “ripple” through a target system, usually from higher 
to lower levels of war. Such effects may also pass into other connected 
systems. An example would be a strike on a headquarters that complicates 
command and control of subordinate units and causes loss of subordinate 
unit synergy. 
Finally, unintended direct or indirect effects are labeled “collateral.” 
Although collateral effects are generally thought of as damage to civilian 
 
 
estimated it would take eight F-117s to destroy each of the bunkers at the SOCs. With only sixteen F-
117s available at the time, thirty-two sorties would be necessary just to neutralize these particular 
targets. However, one of his campaign planners realized that if it were possible to simply cause the 
SOC to be evacuated, it would be fully neutralized during the relevant period. Doing so could be 
accomplished by simply striking the facility with a single 2000-pound bomb. DEPTULA, supra note 26, 
at 12. This is a classic example of the art of targeting, which “seeks to achieve desired effects with the 
least risk, time, and expenditure of resources.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 25, at I-4. 
 45. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 25, at I-6. 
 46. Id. at I-6 n.34. 
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objects, the term also includes damage to military objectives that were not 
the purpose of an attack. 
Effects-based targeting will usually prove to be quicker, more 
effective, and less costly in depriving the enemy of its ability to operate as 
it wishes than simply imposing destruction until the adversary collapses or 
surrenders. This is classic Sun Tzu, who over two millennia ago noted in 
The Art of War, “to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not 
the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of 
skill.”47  
Operations to deny the enemy electrical power illustrate how effects-
based operations work in practice. Power is the lifeblood of command and 
control, air defenses, national leadership, and other aspects of the enemy’s 
nervous system. Traditionally, an attack on an electrical grid involves 
identifying the power stations, power substations, and generating plants; 
listing them as targets; and then sequentially hitting each target until all 
were destroyed. 
In fact, though, the objective is not to physically destroy the entire 
electrical grid but rather to shut off power to select aspects of the enemy’s 
system. An effects-based analysis deconstructs the electrical grid to 
identify the discrete component that will deprive the opponent of the 
electricity in question. Only the discrete component is attacked. Of course, 
conducting an EBO attack depends on the quality of the attacker’s 
information about the grid as well as the attacker’s capability to conduct a 
precision attack such that the target may be destroyed with sufficient 
surety. 
Limiting sorties to only those necessary to achieve a desired effect 
frees up aircraft to conduct other effects-based attacks. The additional 
sorties made available by EBO, in light of technological advances like 
precision and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), permit the 
attacker to conduct strikes en masse across the entire spectrum of conflict. 
Parallel warfare is finally realized. 
EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
Parallel warfare, as such, presents no significant challenges to LOAC. 
It simply envisages the simultaneous application, at different levels of 
war,48 of a greater volume of firepower against more targets than 
previously possible with a fixed number of aircraft. However, the effects-
 
 
 47. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 184 (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., Westview Press 1994). 
 48. The different levels of war are tactical, operational, and strategic. See supra note 29. 
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based operations that help render parallel warfare possible raise a number 
of subtle issues vis-à-vis the normative architecture governing them. 
The most significant stress on LOAC that EBO is likely to cause 
involves present understandings of the term “military objective.” Pursuant 
to paragraph 5.4 of the U.K. Manual, “[a]ttacks shall be strictly limited to 
military objectives,” a provision based on Article 48 of Protocol 
Additional I.49 Paragraph 5.4.1 repeats the Protocol Additional definition 
of military objective verbatim: “Those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”50 
The U.K. Manual emphasizes that both criteria (making an effective 
contribution to military action and offering a definite military advantage at 
the time) must be met before an objective may be styled a legitimate 
target.51 Although this emphasis is merely explanatory, its inclusion 
signals a restrictive operationalization of the concept of military objective. 
Also reflecting the U.K. Manual’s restrictive approach is its list of 
examples, none of which are even marginally controversial: “combatant 
members of the enemy armed forces and their military weapons, vehicles, 
equipment, and installations . . . [and] other objects which have military 
value such as bridges, communications towers, and electricity and refined 
oil production facilities.”52 
Unsurprisingly, the U.K. Manual’s explication of military objective 
tracks its fellow Protocol Additional I Party States and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross more closely than its closest ally, the United 
 
 
 49. Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 48. See also CIHLS, supra note 11, R. 1, 7. The U.K. 
Manual chapter on air operations refers back to the discussion of military objectives in the “Conduct 
of Hostilities” chapter. See U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, paras. 12.21, 12.26a. See also CIHLS, supra 
note 11, R. 1, 7.  
 50. Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 52.2. Protocols II and III of the Conventional 
Weapons Convention and the Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention, as well as many 
military manuals (including those of the United States) and the CIHLS, supra note 11, repeat this 
formula. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980, 1342 
U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (Protocol II) art. 2.6, 1980, as amended, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206; Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), art. 1.3, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171; 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, art. 1(f), 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769; JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 10 (2003); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, para. 8.1.1; CIHLS, supra note 11, 
R. 8. 
 51. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.4.4a. 
 52. Id. para. 5.4.1. It goes on to offer further examples in paragraph 5.4.5, relying heavily on a 
listing proffered by A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 83–84 (2d ed. 2004). 
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States.53 In the most current U.S. LOAC manual, The Commander’s 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Commander’s Handbook), the 
U.S. Navy alters the definition slightly, albeit in a normatively significant 
way: 
Military objectives are combatants and those objects which, by their 
nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the 
enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose total 
or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a 
definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances 
at the time of the attack.54 
The Commander’s Handbook goes on to list examples, most notably 
“[e]conomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support 
and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability.”55  
Although there are certainly cases where economic targets constitute 
military objectives, the Commander’s Handbook’s explanation has fairly 
been criticized by Professor Yoram Dinstein on the ground that it “goes 
too far” since it requires no “proximate nexus to military action.”56 On the 
same basis, he rejects any purely political purpose as justification for 
characterizing economic targets as military objectives.57 Of course, attacks 
on military objectives often generate non-military consequences, but this 
does not preclude attack unless the non-military consequences are 
excessive (violating the principle of proportionality) or the strike violates 
“precautions in attack” requirements.58 Indeed, actually intending to 
 
 
 53. In particular, the U.K. Manual defines “definite” as “a concrete and perceptible military 
advantage rather than a hypothetical and speculative one.” U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.4.4. 
Although this text is drawn from the unofficial commentary on the Protocols in MICHAEL BOTHE, 
KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 326 
(Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1982), in effect it differs little from that contained in the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) official commentary, which states that “it is not legitimate to 
launch an attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages.” COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, para. 
2024 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Brunno Zimmermann eds., Int’l Comm. Red Cross 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY]. 
 54. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, para. 8.1.1. Note that the Commander’s 
Handbook has also been adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard. 
 55. Id. A footnote to this paragraph cites the example of cotton during the American Civil War: 
“The American-British Claims Commission of 1871 recognized that the destruction of raw cotton 
within Confederate territory by the Union was justified during the American Civil war since the sale of 
cotton provided funds for almost all Confederate arms and ammunition.” Id. at 403 n.11 of the 
annotated version. 
 56. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 86 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, arts. 51.5b, 57. See also CIHLS, supra note 11, chs. 4, 5.  
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achieve political, economic, or other non-military ends is acceptable, so 
long as the target qualifies as a legitimate military objective on other 
grounds. To suggest that the mens rea of an attacker could immunize a 
military objective would clearly set a standard that would be impossible to 
implement or enforce in practice. 
Effects-based operations bear on a number of matters in regard to 
military objectives, including the apparent normative divide between the 
United States and United Kingdom. At the most basic level is the question 
of whether potential targets that are unnecessary to strike to achieve a 
desired effect remain military objectives under the law of armed conflict. 
Recall that during the Coalition effort to take Baghdad quickly in March 
and April of 2003, much of the Iraqi Army was ignored because 
destroying forces lying outside the path of the onslaught would have 
merely slowed the advance. In effects-based terms, their destruction would 
not have contributed as meaningfully to the desired operational and 
strategic effects as the rapid decapitation of the Iraqi government and 
military. Even though these forces effectively contributed to military 
action, does it follow that they were immune from attack on the basis that 
their destruction “in the circumstances ruling at the time” would not have 
offered a definite military advantage, as required by the U.K. Manual and 
Protocol Additional I? 
Obviously, the answer is no. It would defy reason to suggest a 
prohibition on striking an adversary’s fielded military forces. The U.K. 
Manual acknowledges as much when it categorically cites “the enemy 
armed forces” as a military objective;59 clearly, they qualify, regardless of 
whether an effects-based strategy necessitates their attack.  
Might one nevertheless argue that the effects sought through EBO 
determine whether objects that are not inherently military, such a bridges 
or other lines of communication, are military objectives in the 
circumstances ruling at the time? In the electrical grid example, such a 
restrictive interpretation would characterize as a legitimate target only that 
aspect of the grid necessary to achieve the effect sought.  
Again, this would be going too far. True, when there are multiple 
targets that can be attacked to achieve a “similar military advantage,” the 
attacker must select the one that causes “the least danger to civilian lives 
and to civilian objects.”60 However, an interpretation of the “precautions 
in attack” requirement that mandates attacking the target most likely to 
 
 
 59. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.4.5. 
 60. Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 57.3; U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.32; 
CIHLS, supra note 11, R. 21. 
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generate a particular desired effect would set an impractical standard that 
would certainly be resisted by warfighters. In the first place, although 
modern technology permits increasingly objective calculations of the 
effects an attack is likely to generate, effects-based determinations remain 
fairly subjective. Moreover, it would be incongruent to require an analysis 
of potential targets to determine the one that would best yield the effect 
sought without assessing the appropriateness of the effect itself in 
achieving the ultimate objective of the military campaign. For instance, if 
the objective is to conquer another country, it may be unclear whether the 
best strategy is military defeat or decapitating the government.  
Most importantly, the law of armed conflict balances humanitarian 
concerns with military considerations. Consider, for example, the 
assessment of incidental injury to civilians and collateral damage to 
civilian objects in light of military advantage in the proportionality 
principle, or the requirement that the military advantage yielded by attack 
on different targets be “similar” before requiring selection of that target 
resulting in the least harm to civilians and civilian objects. To suggest that 
the law requires striking one target over another (or others) because there 
should be a presumption of minimizing damage to the enemy force is to 
inject the law of armed conflict with a purpose it does not have. 
The sole colorable exception is the principle of military necessity. 
Arguably, if a military force seeks a particular effect, striking targets other 
than those that produce the particular effect is unnecessary. 
Any such interpretation would stretch the principle of necessity beyond 
its current bounds. An American military tribunal at Nuremberg described 
military necessity as follows in the Hostage Case: “The destruction of 
property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of 
war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. 
There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of 
property and the overcoming of the enemy forces.”61 In other words, 
military necessity does not set a “no more than enough” standard; it only 
prohibits wanton destruction, that is, destruction without purpose in the 
context of the ongoing conflict. 
This interpretation parallels the U.K. Manual’s text and Protocol 
Additional I’s official Commentary. They simply require that a “definite 
military advantage” be realizable from the attack, ruling out only those 
that are “hypothetical and speculative”62 or “potential or indeterminate.”63 
 
 
 61. Hostage Case (USA v. Wilhelm List et al.) (American Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1948), 
11 NMT 1230, 1253-4. 
 62. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.4.4i. 
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No requirement exists that the advantage be either more than slight or 
greater than that resulting from attacks on other objects, which might 
contribute to achieving a given goal. As will be discussed later, however, 
the intensive review of air campaigns that is now conducted following 
each major operation seems to be inexorably heading towards such 
second-guessing. 
More troublesome with regard to the relationship between LOAC and 
EBO is the emergence of operational concepts that augur towards a broad 
interpretation of military objectives. In classic warfare, one generally 
thinks in terms of defeat of the enemy military and conquest of the enemy 
state. One always desirable effect is the neutralization (if not destruction) 
of the armed forces supporting the sitting government, for it is impossible 
to replace that government and maintain order with active armed 
opposition groups roaming the country. As a result, attacks on military 
forces, the quintessential military objectives, typically dominate air 
tasking orders. The campaign’s Clausewitzian political ends depend in 
great part on the success of such strikes. World War II is archetypal. 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom largely fit 
within this genre, although, there is no question, however, that their 
campaign objectives also included the ouster of the Taliban and Baathist 
regimes, respectively.  
Yet, warfare is changing rapidly in no small part because of asymmetry 
in aerial warfare capabilities. When one side in a conflict can strike from 
the air with near total impunity, it becomes possible, at least in theory, to 
compel the other to either engage in or cease particular conduct through 
the imposition of progressively greater costs. The advantaged party simply 
sits back and pounds its opponent into submission over time, with the 
attacker defining the satisfactory level of “submission.” A capability to 
progressively increase pressure on an opponent who cannot strike back 
(without significant risk to your own forces) makes the decision to resort 
to force for even limited purposes infinitely easier to take. 
Technological advances and their resulting asymmetry have 
predictably moved such compellance campaigns (also labeled coercive 
campaigns) from theory to practice. For instance, Operation Desert Fox, 
the bombing of Iraq in December 1998 following its refusal to cooperate 
with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),64 was designed to 
attack Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability, weaken its military 
 
 
 63. COMMENTARY, supra note 53, para. 2024. 
 64. The United Nations Special Commission was established in UNSC Resolution 687 (Apr. 3, 
1991) to conduct weapons inspections in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
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forces, and force it back into compliance with the United Nations 
inspections program.65 The U.S. and U.K. harbored no intention of 
destroying the Iraqi military or toppling Saddam Hussein.  
Despite the failure of Desert Fox to achieve its compellance aims, the 
following year NATO launched Operation Allied Force against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This effort was intended to coerce 
President Slobodan Milosevic to return to the bargaining table and end the 
systematic and widespread mistreatment of the Kosovar Albanian 
population.66 The compellance nature of the campaign became a point of 
international contention after President Clinton announced that no ground 
forces would enter the fray; instead, NATO would rely on airpower alone 
to force Milosevic to concede to its demands. Although the success of the 
strategy remains a point of contention, Operation Allied Force did 
demonstrate the growing willingness to leverage military dominance in 
pursuit of limited aims.  
In a compellance campaign, the defining question is what to strike to 
most effectively pressure one’s opponent into making a particular 
decision. Obviously, effects-based operations fit very naturally into such 
objectives since a compellance campaign seeks to force a particular 
decision, not necessarily to defeat the enemy militarily.  
It is the search for such a target, which compels specified effects most 
effectively, that strains the principle of military objective. Under a 
restrictive interpretation, only strikes against the enemy armed forces and 
other self-evident military objectives, such as factories producing military 
equipment, may be attacked to compel behavior. Yet, it may well be that 
military capability is not of sufficient value to the enemy leadership to 
force a particular decision. This may be especially true when the side 
 
 
 65. See William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Statement by the President (Dec. 16, 1998), available 
at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/1998/981216-wh2.htm. 
 66. NATO’s demands were set forth in a statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on April 12, 1999, and reaffirmed less than two weeks later by 
heads of states and governments in Washington, D.C. on April 23 and 24. NATO’s demands included: 
a cessation of military action; an end to the violence and repression of the Kosovar Albanians; 
withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces; the presence of an international 
military force in Kosovo; safe return of refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them 
by humanitarian aid organizations; and the establishment of a political framework agreement on the 
basis of the Rambouillet Accords. Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., The Situation In and Around 
Kosovo: Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held 
at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999 M-NAC-1(99)51 (Apr. 12, 1999), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051e.htm; Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Statement on 
Kosovo Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, S-1(99)62, (Apr. 23, 1999), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-062e.htm. 
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seeking to compel limits its own options, as in the case of Operation 
Allied Force’s public exclusion of ground operations.  
Operational concepts appreciative of the fact that attacks on military 
objectives may not be the best ways to generate desired effects are starting 
to gain traction. Although reaching their apogee in compellance 
campaigns, such operational concepts are being touted more generally as 
applicable across the spectrum of warfare.67 Significant in this regard is 
the concept of axiological operations, which counterpoises utility with 
value.68 Utility is the future usefulness of a prospective target to the 
enemy; value is its relative worth. Traditionally, targeting has focused on 
utility—deny the adversary what it needs to operate. Therefore, targets 
tend to be classically military in nature: airfields, vehicles, troops, 
headquarters, and command and control. As an example of sophisticated 
utility targeting, proponents of axiological operations cite Colonel John 
Warden’s model, in which the enemy is attacked as a system consisting of 
five concentric circles: leadership, organic or system essentials, 
infrastructure, population, and fielded forces.69 In Warden’s approach, the 
intent is to cause the system to malfunction such that paralysis sets in.  
While axiological operations do strike utility targets (that is, those that 
are objectively useful to the enemy), much greater attention is focused on 
the center ring, leadership. It is the target’s value to the decision-maker 
that drives prioritization; in other words, the effect of a strike on a decision 
to be made by the relevant leader matters most.  
Moreover, the types of leadership targets differ. One type of leadership 
target is the utility target, which is sometimes struck in order to diminish 
the ability of leadership to communicate with its military or even civilian 
population. An example of utility targeting is the controversial strike on 
Belgrade’s Radio Televisija Srbije (RTS) facility during Operation Allied 
Force.70 By contrast, axiological targets are struck because of their core 
 
 
 67. See, e.g., Peter W.W. Wijninga & Richard Szafranski, Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward 
Axiological Operations, AEROSPACE POWER J., Winter 2000, at 45, available at http://www.airpower. 
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdf.  
 68. See generally id. 
 69. On Warden’s theory, see JOHN A. WARDEN III, THE AIR CAMPAIGN (toExcel Press 2000) 
(1998).  
 70. The attack led to litigation in the European Court of Human Rights that largely centered on 
whether the target was a military objective. The Court later dismissed the case on jurisdictional 
grounds. Bankovic & Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-
XII Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/default.htm (follow “Access Hudoc 
Collection” hyperlink; click “Decisions” checkbox; search “Case Title” for “Bankovic”) [hereinafter 
Bankovic]. 
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value to the leadership, quite aside from their objective usefulness in the 
context of the ongoing campaign. 
Recall the comments made by NATO air commander, Lieutenant 
General Michael Short, regarding Operation Allied Force air attacks 
against Belgrade: 
I felt that on the first night the power should have gone off, and 
major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into the Danube, 
and the water should be cut off so the next morning the leading 
citizens of Belgrade would have got up and asked “Why are we 
doing this?” and asked Milosevic the same question.71 
Short realized that the weakening of the Yugoslav military would not 
force Milosevic to comply with NATO demands because Milosevic could 
remain in power with a lesser military, so long as there was no threat of 
invasion. In Short’s view, Milosevic most feared losing the support of the 
population and thereby political power. In EBO terms, popular support for 
the regime was the value to be attacked to most effectively create the 
effects sought—“incentivizing” compliance with NATO demands. 
Thus, the logic of axiological operations inescapably leads planners 
away from striking traditional military targets and towards striking those 
targets that are more valued by the leadership and are thus most likely to 
generate desired effects most quickly. From a legal perspective, this is 
problematic because it leads to a search for targets that is not necessarily 
undergirded by either the contribution prospective targets make to military 
action, or the extent to which their destruction, damage, or neutralization, 
in the circumstances at the time, produces military advantage. However, 
those are, strictly speaking, the current normative terms of reference for 
attributing military objective status. 
That there is growing dissatisfaction with the restrictive definition 
pronounced in Protocol Additional I and the U.K. Manual is patently 
obvious. Certainly, the Commander’s Handbook’s broad interpretation 
evidences this trend. But the “war sustaining” dispute is no more than 
interpretive in nature; both sides agree civilians and civilian objects should 
enjoy immunity from attack.  
The Short affair shifts the debate to the viability of the standard itself. 
Although General Short later retreated somewhat from his comments 
during a conference held at the U.S. Naval War College,72 the fact remains 
 
 
 71. Craig R. Whitney, Air Wars Won’t Stay Risk-Free, General Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, 
at A22.  
 72. See Michael Short, Operation Allied Force from the Perspective of the NATO Air 
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that the operational concept of striking targets that do not qualify as 
“military objectives” under traditional law of armed conflict 
interpretations, is gaining adherents. As effects-based operations become 
increasingly possible due to technological advances and doctrinal 
maturation, it should come as no revelation that operators are becoming 
enamored with its fullest possible application. Surprising, though, are calls 
from the standard’s guardians—judge advocates—for abandonment (not 
interpretive leniency) of facets of the prohibition on striking protected 
objects. 
Most noteworthy in this regard is the provocative writing of Major 
General Charles Dunlap of the U.S. Air Force. In a fascinating and 
thoughtful 2000 Strategic Review article, he suggested the following: 
We need a new paradigm when using force against societies with 
malevolent propensities. We must hold at risk the very way of life 
that sustains their depredations, and we must threaten to destroy the 
world as they know it if they persist. This means the air weapon 
should be unleashed against entirely new categories of property that 
current conceptions of LOAC put off-limits.73 
General Dunlap was not suggesting the complete abandonment of the 
prohibition on attacking targets that do not presently qualify as military 
objectives under the law of armed conflict. He, for instance, would reserve 
such operations for societies with a “moral compass” that is “wildly 
askew.”74 Nor would General Dunlap target civilians or objects “genuinely 
indispensable to the survival of the noncombatant. . . .” That said, “almost 
everything else of any value would be fair game.”75 Depending on the 
extent to which such targets are valued directly by leaders or by those who 
could exert pressure on leadership, examples include “resorts, along with 
other entertainment, sports, and recreational facilities . . .” and “factories, 
plants, stores, and shops that produce, sell, or distribute luxury 
products. . . .”76 That this is effects-based operations at its grandest is 
illustrated by General Dunlap’s assertion that “[r]educing the middle and 
upper classes to a subsistence level through the destruction of access to all 
 
 
Commander, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN, 78 U.S. NAVAL WAR 
C. INT’L L. STUD. 19 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ 
navy/kosovo_legal.pdf. 
 73. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy in the Post-Kosovo 
Era, 28 STRATEGIC REV. 14 (Summer 2000). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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but essential goods might pressure the very groups best positioned to 
effect the desired change.”77 
These views have gained devotees. In an equally provocative 2001 
article appearing in the Air Force Law Review, Major Jeanne Meyer 
suggested that it might be more humane to attack civilian property than 
purely military objectives if doing so would demoralize the civilian 
population and hasten conflict termination.78 Of course, such theories have 
been around since the advent of airpower; but it is only with the recent and 
remarkable progress in precision, stealth, C4ISR,79 and the resulting 
capability to mount parallel warfare and effects-based operations, that such 
theories have been realizable as anything more than blunt instruments with 
which to brutally beat the enemy into capitulation. In the 21st century, by 
contrast, attacks against civilian property can be conducted surgically, 
causing (in theory) only that harm that is actually desired. Indeed, 
advocates of axiological warfare, including those who would permit 
strikes on civilian targets, cloak themselves today in the very 
humanitarianism underlying the legal standard they reject. Nevertheless, 
their urgings are a vivid departure from the principle of distinction, a 
principle that the International Court of Justice labeled “intransgressible” 
in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.80 
Such a rejection is sure to be fiercely opposed by many in the 
international legal community, all of whom are certain to be heartened by 
the U.K. Manual’s embrace of the principle in its pure form. They will 
find much support for their position. In particular, external assessments of 
recent air campaigns consistently (and predictably) emphasize the 
principle of distinction, while eschewing any hint of a broadening thereof 
along the lines suggested in the Commander’s Handbook (let alone by 
General Dunlap and his protégées). For instance, in assessing strikes 
during Operation Allied Force, particularly that on the RTS station that 
formed the basis for the Bankovic litigation in the European Court of 
Human Rights,81 those who prepared the Final Report to the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated: 
“The media as such is not a traditional target category. To the extent 
particular media components are part of the C3 . . . network they are 
 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on 
Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 143, 182 (2001). 
 79. Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. 
 80. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 35 (July 
8). 
 81. See Bankovic, supra note 70. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/2
p265 Schmitt book pages.doc4/25/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND AERIAL WARFARE 287 
 
 
 
 
military objectives . . . . As a bottom line, civilians, civilian objects and 
civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives.”82 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) similarly rejected any deviation from 
existing LOAC prohibitions on the ground that Operation Allied Force 
was a compellance campaign in which effects-based concepts augured 
towards strikes on objectives that do not qualify as “military objectives” 
under the traditional law of armed conflict. Referring to attacks against 
media facilities, HRW noted that “[w]hile stopping such propaganda may 
serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the 
government’s political support, neither purpose offers the ‘concrete and 
direct’ military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate military 
target.”83 In a similar vein, the organization noted that “[t]he destruction of 
[six] bridges that are not central to transportation arteries or have a purely 
psychological importance does not satisfy the criterion of making an 
‘effective contribution to military action’ or offering a ‘definite military 
advantage’ . . . .”84 Amnesty International’s (AI) report, Collateral 
Damage, was in accord: “Amnesty International recognizes that disrupting 
government propaganda may help undermine the morale of the population 
and the armed forces, but believes it . . . stretches the meaning of ‘effective 
contribution to military action’ and ‘definite military advantage’ beyond 
the acceptable bounds of interpretation.”85 
The sole external review of the Operation Iraqi Freedom air campaign 
to date, Human Rights Watch’s Off Target, retains the emphasis on strict 
adherence to Protocol Additional I’s two-pronged “effective contribution” 
and “definite military advantage” formula.86 Referring to attacks against 
two transformers that resulted on the loss of power to Al Nasiriya for a 
 
 
 82. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final 
Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para. 55, 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1272 (June 13, 2000). 
 83. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, 12 HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Feb. 2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm#P421_112606. 
 84. Id. 
 85. AMNESTY INT’L, NATO/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: “COLLATERAL DAMAGE” OR 
UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED 
FORCE 49 (June 6, 2000), http://web.amnesty.org/library/engindex (search “AI Index” for “EUR 
70/018/2000”; then follow “PDF” hyperlink). 
 86. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 42 (Dec. 2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/usa1203.pdf. For a 
legal analysis of the conflict that differs in part from the conclusions drawn by Human Rights Watch, 
see generally Michael N. Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom: An 
International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 73 (T. McCormack 
ed., 2003). The organization replied in Dinah PoKempner et al., Off Target on the Iraq Campaign: A 
Response to Professor Schmitt, 6 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 111 (T. McCormack ed., 2003). 
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month, HRW stated it was “unclear . . . what effective contribution to Iraqi 
military action” the transformers made.87 Similarly, with regard to strikes 
against television facilities and the Ministry of Information, HRW claimed 
there was “no evidence that Iraqi media was being used to provide direct 
assistance to the Iraqi armed forces.”88  
Lest such comments be dismissed as the application of impractical and 
exaggerated legal standards by over-zealous non-governmental 
organizations, explanatory text in the U.K. Manual embraces equivalent 
criteria. For instance, the U.K. Manual’s non-exhaustive listing of military 
objectives includes “other works producing or developing military 
supplies and other supplies of military value, including metallurgical, 
engineering, chemical, oil and power industries, and infrastructure 
supporting the war effort.”89 The same standard applies to the media, for 
the listing includes “communications installations used for military 
purposes, including broadcasting and television stations, telephone and 
telegraph stations.”90 To preclude an overly broad interpretation of their 
inclusion, the U.K. Manual offers the caveat that the “mere fact that an 
object is on the list does not mean that it is necessarily a military objective. 
It must always be tested against the definition of [military objective], 
especially the question: ‘does it make an effective contribution to military 
action?’”91 Thus, as in Off Target, a relatively direct nexus to military 
operations is the sine qua non of military objective status. 
It is clear that the U.K. Ministry of Defense has placed itself firmly 
within the camp of those who interpret the notion of military objective 
restrictively, that is, with fidelity to the plain text of Protocol Additional I. 
Because the British LOAC community was intimately familiar with the 
Commander’s Handbook’s “war-sustaining” verbiage, the U.K. Manual 
must be seen as a clear rejection of the U.S. position.  
To date, this difference has had a de minimis impact on the conduct of 
combined operations by these close Coalition partners.92 That said, the 
advent of effects-based operations and concomitant calls for adjustment of 
the standard prohibiting attacks against civilian objects by influential U.S. 
 
 
 87. PoKempner et al., supra note 86.  
 88. Id.  
 89. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.4.5e (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. para. 5.4.5h. 
 91. Id. para. 5.4.5. 
 92. However, the French government rejected a number of targets during Operation Allied Force. 
US General Condemns French ‘Red Card,’ BBC NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 22, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/482015.stm. 
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air war thinkers have created a fertile environment for a sharpening of 
positions between and within air forces.  
Even if a potential target qualifies as a military objective, an attack 
thereon must still comply with the principle of proportionality, which 
prohibits indiscriminate attacks, and the duty to take precautions in attack. 
Do effects-based operations raise any thorny issues regarding the 
application of these standards to air warfare? 
The U.K. Manual, in paragraph 5.33, articulates the principle of 
proportionality in text drawn verbatim from Protocol Additional I.93 It 
prohibits attacks that “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”94 Although the reference to “military” 
advantage might at first glance appear to raise the same issues as use of the 
adjective in conjunction with objectives, it does not. Rather, the target 
must be a military objective before being considered for attack and thus, 
before the principle of proportionality comes into play. So long as the 
targeted object or individuals make an “effective contribution to military 
action” such that their destruction, damage, or neutralization offers a 
“definite military advantage,” then by definition, concrete and direct 
advantage accrues.95 The U.K. Manual expressly makes this connection 
when it provides: 
“Concrete and direct” means that the advantage to be gained is 
identifiable and quantifiable and one that flows directly from the 
attack, not some pious hope that it might improve the military 
situation in the long term. In this sense it is like the term “definite” 
used in the definition of military objects.96 
In fact, effects-based operations have the potential for considerably 
limiting the collateral damage and incidental injury against which military 
advantage is weighed in proportionality calculations. However, this 
possibility is less relevant to the application of the proportionality 
principle per se, than to the duty to take precautions in attack, the 
 
 
 93. Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, arts. 51.5b, 57.2. See also CIHLS, supra note 11, R. 14, 
18. 
 94. The official International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary to the Protocol 
Additional indicates that the expression “show[s] that the advantage concerned should be substantial 
and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only 
appear in the long term should be disregarded.” COMMENTARY, supra note 53, para. 2209. 
 95. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.4.1. 
 96. Id. para. 5.33.3. 
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obligation to take “constant care” to “spare the civilian population, 
civilians, and civilian objects.”97 
The precaution in attack rules set out comprehensively in paragraph 
5.32 of the U.K. Manual reproduce those found in Article 57 of Protocol 
Additional I. Subsequent paragraphs in the U.K. Manual painstakingly 
interpret the rules in ways comporting with accepted understandings of 
Article 57. In almost every scenario, effects-based operations enhance 
compliance with the precautions in attack norms. Of particular relevance is 
the command that “[w]here there is a choice between different military 
objectives whose attack will yield the same military advantage, the one 
whose attack is expected to cause the least incidental damage should be 
chosen.”98 During the effects-based planning process, target systems are 
deconstructed in search of that facet thereof that will best yield the desired 
effect. Doing so requires an assessment of other system elements such that 
multiple options will naturally surface. This, in turn, eases the 
identification of that target or group of targets that can generate the effect 
sought while causing the smallest amount of incidental injury or collateral 
damage. Indeed, EBO advocates cite the ability to moderate incidental 
injury and collateral damage as a key strength of the approach.99 
Additional features of effect-based operations contribute indirectly to 
fulfilling the precautions in attack obligations. For instance, a duty exists 
to “do everything feasible to verify that the proposed target is not 
protected from attack and that it is a military objective.”100 The ISR 
capabilities that underlie EBO and the comprehensive target system 
analysis required to effectively mount effects-based operations lend 
themselves to a greater appreciation of the selected target’s nature.  
Requisite precautions also include “constant review” of target lists “in 
. . . light of fresh information and changing circumstances.”101 In attrition 
warfare, such reviews are less important because the ultimate objective is 
to destroy the enemy military over time. However, as an aspect of parallel 
warfare, effects-based operations seek effects with the least possible 
expenditure of assets. Since effects depend on the circumstances at the 
time of attack, frequent reassessment of prospective targets necessarily 
occurs.  
 
 
 97. Id. para. 5.32; Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 57.1; CIHLS, supra note 11, R. 15. 
 98. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.32; Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 57.3; 
CIHLS, supra note 11, R. 21. 
 99. See, e.g., Effects Based Operations Briefing, supra note 31. 
 100. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.32.2; Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 
57.2(a)(i); CIHLS, supra note 11, R. 16. 
 101. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 5.32.3. 
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Further, planners must select “the means (weapons) and methods 
(tactics) [of warfare] which will cause the least incidental damage 
commensurate with military success.”102 This is a subjective standard, 
particularly in an era when military technology improves measurably with 
each conflict. As noted by the U.K. Manual, “developing technology does 
bring with it a change in the standards affecting the choice of munitions 
when taking the precautions. . . .”103 Robust examination of not only 
targets, but also of the most effective methods and means of striking them, 
dramatically eases fulfillment of this requirement. Indeed, the U.K. 
Manual’s listing of factors that commanders should consider to limit 
collateral damage and incidental injury when planning missions reads like 
a checklist for effective EBO planning:  
a. the importance of the target and the urgency of the situation; 
b. intelligence about the proposed target—what it is being, or will 
be, used for and when; 
c. the characteristics of the target itself, for example, whether it 
houses dangerous forces; 
d. what weapons are available, their range, accuracy, and radius of 
effect; 
e. conditions affecting the accuracy of targeting, such as terrain, 
weather, and time of day; 
f. factors affecting incidental loss or damage, such as the proximity 
of civilians or civilian objects in the vicinity of the target or other 
protected objects or zones and whether they are inhabited, or the 
possible release of hazardous substances as a result of the attack; 
g. the risk to his own troops of the various options open to him.104 
EBO planning similarly promotes the injunction to consider the timing of 
an attack105 because the ability and need to create desired effects shift over 
time. 
 
 
 102. Id. para. 5.32.4; Protocol Additional I, supra note 3, art. 57.2(a)(ii); CIHLS, supra note 11, 
R. 17. 
 103. U.K. MANUAL, supra note 10, para. 12.51. 
 104. Id. para. 5.32.5. 
 105. Id. para. 5.32.6. 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This Article has explored the law of armed conflict in the context of a 
new approach to targeting during armed conflicts: effects-based 
operations. The effort is especially relevant in the context of aerial 
warfare. Of all the media in which 21st century warfare is conducted 
(except perhaps cyberspace), air is the medium experiencing the greatest 
transformation in the conduct of hostilities. As the transformation unfolds, 
consequent conceptual innovations such as effects-based operations are 
placing stress on the existing normative architecture. 
In some cases, effects-based operations promote observance of the law 
of armed conflict. This is the case with regard to the duty to take 
precautions in attack and the application of the principle of 
proportionality. Yet, negative pressures on existing understandings of the 
law also exist. Particularly disquieting is the rather subtle impact of such 
concepts on the principle of distinction, especially the reach of the term 
“military objective.” The U.K. Ministry of Defense has elected to hold the 
line by embracing the relatively restrictive notions expressed in Protocol 
Additional I.  
This is a sage choice for three reasons. First, as long as the U.S. and its 
closest allies enjoy unchallengeable military supremacy, its opponents will 
have to fight them asymmetrically. As demonstrated by both transnational 
terrorism and insurgent operations in Iraq, militarily disadvantaged parties 
to a conflict commonly adopt tactics and strategies that violate LOAC, 
including attacks against civilians and civilian objects.106 This being so, it 
hardly makes sense to relax the legal norms that enable the U.K. and other 
victim states to characterize such conduct as unlawful. 
Second, relaxed norms, especially when not widely accepted, allow 
one’s opponents to engage in “lawfare,” i.e., alleging LOAC violations in 
order to undercut domestic and international support.107 As the U.S. 
learned during its struggle to enlist troop contributors for operations in 
 
 
 106. On this topic, see Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the 
Principle of Distinction (Nov. 2003) (briefing paper, on file with the Harvard University Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Resolution), available at http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/ 
Hi%20Tech%20Low%20Tech%20Schmitt%20formatted.doc. 
 107. Lawfare refers to the effort to undercut an opponent’s support by making it appear to violate 
international humanitarian or human rights law (or by publicizing actual violations). That support may 
be either domestic or international. For a discussion of lawfare, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and 
Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Nov. 29–30, 2001) 
(working paper, on file with the Harvard University Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, National 
Security and Human Rights Program), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20 
Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
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Iraq, perceptions of unlawfulness, real or not, can seriously undermine 
operational and strategic objectives. Maintaining strict fidelity to widely 
accepted norms denies one’s opponents the opportunity to engage 
successfully in “lawfare.” 
Finally, and conversely, a reputation for lawfulness can spawn soft 
power.108 Maintaining the normative high ground in the face of contrary 
pressures generates state legitimacy that translates indirectly into tangible 
and intangible assets. For instance, it is easier for perceived law-abiding 
states to form “coalitions of the willing” than those who are seen to skirt 
the law imperiously.109 Similarly, states that strictly abide by the jus in 
bello are more likely to enjoy the benefit of the doubt vis-à-vis grey area 
jus ad bellum cases than those who do not. It is therefore surprising how 
willingly states sometimes sacrifice the long-term value of soft power on 
the altar of short-term expediency. Effects-based operations must not be 
allowed to contribute to this unfortunate reality. 
 
 
 108. For a discussion of the relationship between law and soft power, see Michael N. Schmitt, The 
Law of Armed Conflict as Soft Power: Optimizing Strategic Choice, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS 
THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT 455 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2000). 
 109. Id.  
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